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The future of EU citizenship status during crisis – is there a role for 
fundamental rights protection? 
 
Adrienne Yong 
 
Forthcoming in Journal of International and Comparative Law (2020) 7(2) 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper assesses whether there is a future for the status of EU citizenship and fundamental 
rights. It operates from the premise that rights associated with EU citizenship are inherently 
underlined by fundamental rights protection. The context within which this question is 
answered is that of the four recent “crises” faced by the EU since the Treaty of Lisbon, namely, 
the Eurozone, migration and rule of law crises and Brexit. These examples serve to highlight 
how the Court of Justice of the EU’s apparent choice not to fully integrate fundamental rights 
into EU citizenship case law affects the fundamentality of EU citizenship status, as it was 
originally hailed to be. It argues that there is a case to be made for a stronger role for 
fundamental rights protection as part of the future of EU citizenship’s status. 
 
 
Keywords: EU citizenship, fundamental rights, Eurozone crisis, rule of law crisis, migration 
crisis, Brexit. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the last decade of the EU’s recent history, various crises have presented challenges to a 
view of the EU’s future as one that imagines an ‘ever closer Union’.1 One set of challenges it 
faces are those which affect rights under the status of EU citizenship.2 This paper will assess 
what the future looks like for the status of EU citizenship and its relationship with fundamental 
rights protection specifically within the turbulent political context of crisis that has affected, and 
continues to affect, the EU, since the end of the 2009 when the Lisbon Treaty came into force. 
EU citizenship status is understood in this paper with reference to fundamental rights 
protection as an integral part of the status’ scope. Fundamental rights warrant greater attention 
since Lisbon made the Charter of Fundamental Rights binding, and the EU mandated 
accession to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).3 The “four crises” – the 
Eurozone, migration and rule of law crises and the UK’s withdrawal from the EU – make up 
the aforementioned turbulent political context for analysis in this paper. By analysing case law 
from the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), limitations on the scope of EU citizenship – which 
includes fundamental rights protection – become evident. However, accepting the premise 
that protection associated with EU citizenship status is inherently underlined by fundamental 
rights allows for a different view of the future of the status and the scope of its relevant rights. 
 
Hypothesising how the concept of EU citizenship should develop has long been a feature of 
the literature and commentary on the subject, with the CJEU’s interpretation of Treaty 
provisions determining the scope of EU citizenship status.4 Initially, the discussion surrounded 
the relevance of EU citizenship status given that rights under the free movement of persons 
were almost identical to citizenship.5 This paper’s central argument is premised on an 
increasingly constitutionalised EU fundamental rights discourse being instrumental in adding 
flesh to bones of EU citizenship status to distinguish it from worker status.6 It contextualises 
EU citizenship’s future within the EU’s increasingly complicated political atmosphere and 
uniquely conceives of EU citizenship as one that has always been seen as a gateway to 
fundamental rights protection before the CJEU. It is this particular take on EU citizenship that 
                                               
1 Preamble; Article 1, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2008] OJ C115/13. 
2 Article 20-21, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2008] OJ C115/47. 
3 Article 6 TEU. 
4 See for a selection of notable early scholarship: À Castro d’Oliveira, ‘Workers and other Persons: Step-by-Step 
from Movement to Citizenship - Case Law 1995-2001’ [2002] CML Rev 77; Eleanor Spaventa, ‘From Gebhard to 
Carpenter: Towards a (Non-) Economic European Constitution’ (2004) 41 CML Rev 743; Michael Dougan, ‘The 
Constitutional Dimension to the Case Law on Union Citizenship’ (2006) 5 Inter Alia 77; Eleanor Spaventa, ‘Seeing 
the Wood despite the Trees? On the Scope of Union Citizenship and its Constitutional Effects’ (2008) 45 CML Rev 
13; Charlotte O'Brien, ‘Real Links, Abstract Rights and False Alarms: the Relationship between the ECJ's "Real 
Link" Case Law and National Solidarity’ [2008] ELR 643. 
5 See Article 45 TFEU; C-370/90 Singh EU:C:1992:296; C-168/91 Konstantinidis EU:C:1993:115. 
6 Siofra O'Leary, ‘Putting Flesh on the Bones of European Union Citizenship’ (1999) 24 ELR 68. 
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is in jeopardy in the recent context of the four crises.7 
 
Shaw explains that ‘at the national level, citizenship is invested with an intensity of political 
significance and substance, and a connection to the body politic in the broadest sense.’8 On 
this basis, the paper will argue that over the years, this connection has been substantiated by 
a conferral of fundamental rights protection by the CJEU. This has become more explicitly part 
of the rights conferred under EU citizenship status.9 The CJEU’s judicial narrative appearing 
to link the two concepts is thus not just a normative exercise, but a decision grounded in the 
Treaties after Lisbon constitutionalised the EU fundamental rights discourse. This reasoning 
forms the basis of how conclusions are reached on the future of EU citizenship status in this 
political context. By adopting this contextual approach to case law analysis, this paper explains 
why restrictive trends in the context of the four crises are not desirable, but can be different in 
future if fundamental rights are given more consideration. 
 
This paper is structured as follows. First, it outlines the original trajectory of the development 
of EU citizenship status before the CJEU. It emphasises the role of fundamental rights, how 
and why they are so connected to EU citizenship. Second, the paper brings citizenship status 
into the post-Lisbon context of the Eurozone crisis, the migration crisis, the rule of law crisis 
and the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. In each crisis, the claim is that there is room for 
fundamental rights protection to play a more pivotal role in protecting the individual as an EU 
citizen. Thirdly, the paper argues that restrictive case law jeopardises the future of EU 
citizenship status and fundamental rights protection, and that there are legitimate reasons and 
a feasible way for these rights to be more central to the CJEU’s considerations. 
 
II. ORIGINAL TRAJECTORY OF EU CITIZENSHIP 
 
This paper acknowledges that there is disagreement about framing EU citizenship status as 
entirely one that seeks to protect fundamental rights as its end goal.10  That particular debate 
is outside this paper’s scope, as its main arguments derive from the claim that it is less 
normatively desirable to base EU citizenship status entirely on rights to free movement and 
residency rather than fundamental rights protection. It has been said that ‘for the Court to 
                                               
7 See the different notions of framing the future of the EU in Elaine Fahey’s contribution to this Special Issue. 
8 Jo Shaw, ‘Citizenship: Contrasting Dynamics at the Interface of Integration and Constitutionalism’ [2020] EUI 
Working Paper RSCAS 2020/33, 5, footnotes omitted. 
9 For the full argument this paper is based on, see Adrienne Yong, The Rise and Decline of Fundamental Rights 
in EU Citizenship (Hart Publishing 2019). 
10 See Martijn van den Brink, ‘EU citizenship and (fundamental) rights: Empirical, normative, and conceptual 
problems’ (2019) 25 ELJ 21; Martijn van den Brink, ‘Justice, Legitimacy and the Authority of Legislation within the 
European Union’ (2019) 82 MLR 293. 
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apply cross-border market logic to finding the limits of EU citizenship is an impermissible 
assault on the very idea of human dignity’.11 Emphasising free movement (as the Treaty 
provisions on the internal market do) makes static citizens the victims rather than beneficiaries 
of EU citizenship.12 Therefore, the original foundation of fundamental rights protection in EU 
citizenship is argued to be equal treatment under Article 18 TFEU. Later this also included 
rights under the ECHR and eventually rights under Charter of Fundamental Rights.13 
 
Conferring citizenship rights based on whether a citizen has exercised their right to free 
movement indirectly discriminates against those who cannot move – whether for physical or 
socioeconomic reasons. Free movement rights were originally conferred to those 
economically able and willing to move for work under Article 45 TFEU.14 This was an early 
criticism of the discourse on the free movement of persons; failing to adequately distinguish 
workers’ rights from EU citizenship status.15 Therefore, arguing that fundamental rights 
protection should underlie EU citizenship status more explicitly shifts the status of EU 
citizenship to one that relies on humanity and personhood rather than legal status of 
citizenship.16 In the seminal “Reverse Solange” piece, academics from the Max Planck 
Institute in Heidelberg led by von Bogdandy endorsed an expansion of the fundamental rights 
and EU citizenship status relationship by grounding their argument in a broad reading of 
respect for human rights under Article 2 TEU.17 This paper argues that this is exactly what EU 
citizenship status protects.18 
 
It is not the intention of this paper to rehash a well-known history of EU citizenship.19 It is, 
                                               
11 Dimitry Kochenov, ‘On Tiles and Pillars: EU Citizenship as a Federal Denominator’ in Dimitry Kochenov (ed), EU 
Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights (Cambridge University Press 2017) 43. 
12 Jo Shaw, ‘‘Shunning’ and ‘seeking’ membership: Rethinking citizenship regimes in the European constitutional 
space’ (2019) 8 Global Constitutionalism 425, 433. 
13 In case law, see for reference to Article 8 ECHR at first, C-192/99 Kaur EU:C:2001:106; C-148/02 Garcia Avello 
EU:C:2003:539; C-200/02 Zhu and Chen EU:C:2004:639; C-353/06 Grunkin and Paul EU:C:2008:559; C-127/08 
Metock and Others EU:C:2008:449 then later Article 7 Charter, C-135/08 Rottmann EU:C:2010:104; C-480/08 
Teixeira EU:C:2010:83; C-310/08 Ibrahim EU:C:2010:80; C-208/09 Sayn-Wittgenstein EU:C:2010:806; C-391/09 
Runevic-Vardyn and Wardyn EU:C:2011:291; C-34/09 Zambrano EU:C:2011:124. 
14 And their families. See Council Regulation 492/2011 of 5 April 2011 on freedom of movement for workers within 
the Union [2011] OJ L 141/1. 
15 C-85/96 Martinez Sala EU:C:1998:217. 
16 See Dimitry Kochenov, ‘The citizenship of personal circumstances in Europe’ in Daniel Thym (ed), Questioning 
EU Citizenship (Hart Publishing 2018) 47, though he is not so enthusiastic about linking fundamental rights to EU 
citizenship status. 
17 Armin Von Bogdandy and others, ‘Reverse Solange - Protecting the Essence of Fundamental Rights against EU 
Member States’ (2012) 49 CML Rev 489. This specific idea will be discussed later in the paper under the 
consideration for the rule of law crises. 
18 In comparison with the internal market, which protects market integration, see Pedro Caro de Sousa, ‘Quest for 
the Holy Grail—Is a Unified Approach to the Market Freedoms and European Citizenship Justified?’ [2014] ELJ 
499, 501. See further, Siofra O'Leary, ‘The Relationship Between Community Citizenship and the Protection of 
Fundamental Rights in Community Law’ (1995) 32 CML Rev 519; Sara Iglesias Sánchez, ‘Fundamental Rights and 
Citizenship of the Union at a Crossroads: A Promising Alliance or a Dangerous Liaison?’ (2014) 20 ELJ 464. 
19 Much of the literature has been dedicated to this already, see fn4 and HU d’Oliveira, European Citizenship - Pie 
in the Sky (Sage Publications 1995); Niamh Nic Shuibhne, ‘The Third Age of EU Citizenship’ in Phil Syrpis (ed), 
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however, important to highlight the key developments which have shaped how fundamental 
rights protection became the primary essence of the now infamous description of EU 
citizenship as ‘destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States’,20 and 
why. Whilst this was not necessarily explicit from the beginning, the implicit links to 
fundamental rights protection, originally through more established processes such as adhering 
to the general principles of EU law or the internal market rules,21 meant that fundamental rights 
protection found its way legitimately into the jurisprudence of citizenship rights. It is argued 
that reference to the principle of non-discrimination under Article 18 TFEU, the legal basis for 
the CJEU deciding EU citizenship status was different from worker status, was one of the first 
examples of an implicit yet present fundamental rights discourse early on in the 
jurisprudence.22 
 
Although widely criticised at first for simply being a cosmetic introduction to the Treaties,23 
questions were raised as to how far and wide-reaching the status of EU citizenship would be, 
and to what extent fundamental rights would, should and could play a role in the scope ratione 
materiae of EU citizenship status. The conferral of fundamental rights under EU citizenship is 
argued to be consistent with key developments in the status’ history and original objectives 
behind establishing a status of citizenship in the EU, if taken from a rights perspective. As 
fundamental rights protection gained greater constitutional footing through Article 6 TEU, the 
CJEU pushed boundaries to allow conferral of such rights by interpreting citizenship as the 
legal gateway for them. From being declared the “fundamental status” in Grzelczyk in 2001, 
to explicit incorporation of the right to private and family life under Article 8 ECHR in case law 
in the mid to late 2000s,24 to the seminal Zambrano case in 2011 where EU citizenship was 
declared an independent legal basis for rights, which potentially included fundamental rights.25 
These cases, and many others, demonstrated how the CJEU began conferring rights to 
individuals as citizens, rather than just as workers.26 
                                               
The Judiciary, the Legislature and the EU Internal Market (CUP 2012); Yong (n9). 
20 C-184/99 Grzelczyk EU:C:2001:458, para 31. 
21 C-29/69 Stauder v. Ulm EU:C:1969:57; C-11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft EU:C:1970:114; C-5/88 
Wachauf EU:C:1989:321; C-260/89 ERT EU:C:1991:254. 
22 Sala (n15). 
23 O'Leary, ‘Putting Flesh on the Bones of European Union Citizenship’ (n6); Carole Lyons, ‘A Voyage Around 
Article 8: An Historical Evaluation on the Fate of European Union Citizenship’ (1997) 17 YEL 135; Jo Shaw, ‘The 
Many Pasts and Futures of Citizenship in the European Union’ (1997) 22 ELR 554. 
24 See cases in fn13. 
25 Zambrano (n13), though arguably there were signs of this potential as early as C-413/99 Baumbast 
EU:C:2002:493 in para 84, ‘Purely as a national of a Member State, and consequently a citizen of the Union, Mr 
Baumbast therefore has the right to rely on Article [21 TFEU]’. 
26 This includes, but is not limited to, previously economically active individuals: Sala (n15); Grzelczyk (n20); C-
60/00 Carpenter EU:C:2002:434 (n); C-224/98 D'hoop EU:C:2002:432; Baumbast (n25); derived rights of from 
family members: Garcia Avello (n24); Chen (n13); Zambrano (n13) and students and other non-economically active 
individuals: C-138/02 Collins EU:C:2004:172; C-456/02 Trojani EU:C:2004:488; C-209/03 Bidar EU:C:2005:169; 
C-158/07 Förster EU:C:2008:630; C-22/08 Vatsouras EU:C:2009:344. 
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Through CJEU jurisprudence, interpretations of the status of EU citizenship began to embrace 
a broader integrationist objective as its material and personal scope widened. It is argued both 
strands of broadening can be attributed to greater fundamental rights protection. Moving 
towards fundamental rights moved the status of citizenship away from the internal market.27 
Since the CJEU in Zambrano declared EU citizenship status an independent legal basis for 
rights, a direct link to fundamental rights became possible.28 When the Lisbon Treaty came 
into force, it could have been the watershed moment for fundamental rights and EU citizenship 
status since fundamental rights were now given binding status in the Charter and the EU was 
committed to ECHR accession.29 However, this did not happen. The claim is that this is largely 
due to the waning appetite for such a wide-reaching constitutional shift in an increasingly 
hostile political atmosphere as the EU rides the waves of its “four crises”: the Eurozone, 
migration, rule of law crises and Brexit. 
 
III. THE FOUR CRISES 
 
This section will show how the future of the fundamental rights discourse in EU citizenship has 
been affected by the four “crises” in the context of the CJEU’s interpretation of the status as 
the legal gateway to fundamental rights protection. How the CJEU approaches citizenship and 
fundamental rights in its jurisprudence will be central to the analysis here, since Lisbon 
constitutionalised the rights discourse in Article 6 TEU. Since Lisbon, there has not been a 
notable enough shift towards integrating rights protection into EU citizenship status, so this 
paper argues the merits of doing so with specific regard to EU citizenship’s future. This section 
analyses case law on the nexus between citizenship and legal area relevant to the crisis at 
hand (finance, migration, rule of law, nationality) or, in some situations, cases concerning the 
relevant crises alongside an examination of citizenship case law decided in the same 
timeframe. The aim is to show how each crisis has affected the jurisprudence of the CJEU 
and subsequently, the future of citizenship status and its requisite rights through a fundamental 
rights lens. 
 
 
                                               
27 Michelle Everson, ‘The Legacy of the Market Citizen’ in Jo Shaw and Gillian More (eds), New Legal Dynamics 
of the European Union (OUP 1995). 
28 See Niamh Nic Shuibhne, ‘Seven Questions for Seven Paragraphs’ (2011) 36 ELR 161; Hanneke van Eijken 
and Sybe de Vries, ‘A New Route into the Promised Land? Being a European Citizen after Ruiz Zambrano’ (2011) 
36 ELR 704; Kay Hailbronner and Daniel Thym, ‘Case C-34/09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v. Office national de 
l'emploi (ONEm), Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 8 March 2011’ (2011) 48 CML Rev 1253.  
29 Article 6 TEU; see Yong (n9) 143ff. On whether this accession is desirable in the context of the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice, see Tobias Lock’s contribution to this Special Issue. 
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A. EUROZONE CRISIS 
 
The Eurozone crisis, the earliest of the four crises in this paper, began around the same time 
the Lisbon Treaty came into force at the end of 2009.30 It is understood that its widespread 
effects trickled down to affect the quality of life of EU citizens too, including those not in 
Member States directly affected by the crisis.31 This can be attributed to the fact that the Euro 
itself has arguably been used as a tool to forge European identity and integrate the 
community.32 If seen as a vehicle of social cohesion,33 then there is an argument that the 
Eurozone did indeed seek to achieve the same objective as EU citizenship status, namely, an 
ever closer Union. However, if this connection is made, then there would logically also be a 
correlation between the problems associated with the Eurozone debt crisis and an increasing 
Euroscepticism in the EU project of integration. This would translate to there being less 
appetite for a wide scope of fundamental rights under EU citizenship. 
 
It is necessary to acknowledge the political atmosphere around the Eurozone crisis in light of 
citizenship cases decided during this period. Whilst the debt crisis was happening, faith in EU 
project was waning, particularly in 2011.34 In this timeframe, what had the potential to be 
opportunities for deeper integration of fundamental rights into EU citizenship because of their 
binding status in the Lisbon Treaty turned into cautious, more deferential judgments, to 
national interests in particular. This often meant restricting the wide scope of EU citizenship to 
avoid claims that EU citizens were becoming unreasonable burdens on host Member States, 
more reminiscent of language used to describe market citizenship. Zambrano and the cases 
in 2011 on similar family reunification issues concerning non-EU citizens are good examples 
of this.35 After the CJEU declared EU citizenship status an independent legal basis for rights, 
it did not clearly state whether fundamental rights should have a central role to play in its 
judicial assessments going forward. As a result of this lack of clarity, there was room for the 
CJEU to decide against fully integrating fundamental rights and EU citizenship, strictly 
                                               
30 Beginning with Greece, when it became evident that they may default on their debt. See ‘Greece's debt reaches 
300bn euros’ BBC News (10 December 2009) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/8406665.stm> accessed 10 
June 2015.  
31 In Eurobarometer 76.1 Crisis (European Parliament, January 2012) 6, ‘The majority of Europeans say that they 
are now feeling the effects of the crisis: approximately nine out of ten people see the impact in the world, European 
and national economies, and 59% of respondents when it comes to their personal situation.’; Espen DH Olsen, 
‘Eurocrisis and EU citizenship’ in Virginie Guiraudon, Carlo Ruzza and Hans-Jörg Trenz (eds), Europe’s Prolonged 
Crisis (Springer 2015) 86. 
32 Cris Shore, ‘The euro crisis and European citizenship’ (2012) 28 Anthropology Today 5, 7. 
33 Olsen (n31). 
34 Major Trends in the European Public Opinion with regard to the European Union (European Parliament 
Exploratory Study, November 2015) 11ff. 
35 C-434/09 McCarthy EU:C:2011:277; C-256/11 Dereci EU:C:2011:734. 
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adhering to the black letter criteria under the Directive 2004/38.36 This, it is argued, is 
inconsistent with the trajectory and potential fundamental rights had to become integrated into 
EU citizenship. 
 
Then, in the aftermath of Zambrano over a year later, in the seminal case of Pringle, a question 
of legality of the Treaty in establishing the emergency European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
to safeguard the Eurozone came before the CJEU.37 Some perceived the judgment as beyond 
the CJEU’s competences and a political choice to save the Eurozone, but if the CJEU did not 
uphold the ESM Treaty, it would have put the entire Eurozone at risk of collapse. The incentive 
to avoid this was enough to instead act to fulfil national interests.38 A similar situation of 
creative and political judicial reasoning in citizenship is the earlier case of Carpenter,39 where 
only a potential cross-border link under the free movement of services was determined by the 
CJEU to be enough to bring a family about to be separated within the scope of protection 
under the Treaty. Some would argue this case was decided with the objective of upholding 
fundamental rights in mind. Therefore, from both situations, it can be extrapolated that that if 
there was a political appetite for it – be it saving the Eurozone or greater fundamental rights 
protection – the CJEU has precedent for pushing boundaries towards this wider objective. 
 
Therefore, the overall argument of the Eurozone crisis’ effects on citizenship status and 
fundamental rights is a correlation between increasing deference by the CJEU as to what the 
political atmosphere at the time demands. This kind of development shapes the general acquis 
commmunautaire of the EU, and sets the tone for how it may proceed in future. Especially in 
the wake of the various crises that unfolded after the Eurozone one – not to mention that the 
Eurozone crisis was not resolved immediately – it would seem logical to assume that 
deference to political sensitivities is a deciding factor for the CJEU.40 Pringle demonstrates 
this. However, this is not necessarily to the benefit of the status of EU citizenship, in that 
deference in this case is to the national Member State interests. In Pringle, it was mainly the 
interests of Member States suffering directly from the debt crisis and the political issues at 
play. 
 
                                               
36 C-424/10 Ziolkowski EU:C:2011:866; C-348/09 PI EU:C:2012:300; C-40/11 Iida EU:C:2012:691; C-86/12 Alokpa 
EU:C:2013:645. See Steve Peers and Chiara Berneri, ‘Iida and O and S: Further Developments in the Immigration 
Status of Static EU Citizens’ [2013] JIANL 162. 
37 C-370/12 Pringle EU:C:2012:756. 
38 Alicia Hinarejos, ‘The Role of the Courts in the Wake of the Eurozone Crisis’ in Mark Dawson, Henrik Enderlein 
and Christian Joerges (eds), Beyond the Crisis: The Governance of Europe's Economic, Political and Legal 
Transformation (OUP 2015) 124. 
39 Carpenter (n26). 
40 Urška Šadl and Mikael Rask Madsen, ‘Did the financial crisis change European citizenship law? An analysis of 
citizenship rights adjudication before and after the financial crisis’ (2016) 22 ELJ 40, 57. 
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B. MIGRATION CRISIS 
 
Soon after most of the affected Member States had officially exited their financial bailout 
programmes, the EU began to see a flood of migrants arriving in its territory in 2015 and 
seeking refuge and asylum within the territory of the Union. This led to an increase in litigation 
before the CJEU that dealt with balancing the rights of migrants versus the interests of Member 
States, as well as the EU’s interest in controlling its borders.41 The second crisis in this paper, 
the migration crisis and its associated Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), is treated 
as a context within which to highlight the fragility of the EU project of cooperation and 
integration. This section offers a different take of EU citizenship that has since been espoused 
in this paper, which will serve to emphasise why the fundamental rights relationship is all the 
more important for its future. 
 
Rather than considering more traditional migration case law which often concerns non-EU 
citizens, this section will use the migration crisis as a context within which to consider the value 
of EU citizenship status for EU citizens. The differences between those “privileged” enough to 
benefit from protection and those who do not are more noticeable in this context. The 
argument is that fundamental rights can close this gap somewhat. Rights to free movement 
have been ‘paired with a closure of the outer boundaries of the EU’,42 leading Fine to argue 
that ‘there is a far greater and growing divide between European citizens and the people they 
want to keep out.’43 EU citizenship’s exclusionary nature puts a spotlight on problems 
associated with free movement in the well-known “Fortress Europe” criticism – that free 
movement rights and principles emphasising EU borders imply that being within the EU is a 
privilege. There is a sense of a fortified fortress of European nations, protecting those within 
at the expense of keeping others out.44 This section will thus consider the nexus between EU 
citizenship and the AFSJ through extradition and arrest warrant cases, to argue for a greater 
role for fundamental rights protection as a way to redress the balance in the CJEU in its 
tendency to prioritise free movement rights under EU citizenship. 
 
Cases on the extradition of EU citizens to non-EU Member States show the CJEU adopting a 
protective role that keeps its own citizens safe, but whose acknowledgement of fundamental 
                                               
41 Daniel Thym, ‘The “Refugee Crisis” as a Challenge of Legal Design and Institutional Legitimacy’ (2016) 53 CML 
Rev 1545. 
42 Shaw, ‘‘Shunning’ and ‘seeking’ membership: Rethinking citizenship regimes in the European constitutional 
space’ (n12) 434. 
43 Sarah Fine, ‘Whose Freedom of Movement Is Worth Defending?’ in Rainer Baubock (ed), Debating European 
Citizenship (Springer 2019) 131. 
44 Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, ‘The Rule of Law in the European Union - Putting the Security into the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice’ (2004) 29 ELR 219. 
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rights protection more broadly is missing. This, it is argued, is not a good precedent for cases 
that do not involve EU citizens, which have increased since the migration crisis begun. In 
Petruhhin, to protect an Estonian in Latvia from being extradited to Russia, the CJEU decided 
that claiming a restriction of his free movement rights under Article 21 TFEU was enough.45 
This was instead of relying on EU citizenship status under Article 20 TFEU requiring equal 
treatment under Article 18 TFEU as if the claimant was Latvian and subject to national laws 
that would have seen the same outcome.46 Cleverly, it achieves the objective of protecting the 
Union citizen from being subjected to non-EU jurisdiction,47 but potentially has wider 
implications for fundamental rights protection as it emphasises free movement rather than 
equal treatment, widening the gap even further between EU citizens and non-EU migrants. 
 
Whilst it is recognised that non-EU migrants do not benefit from protection under EU 
citizenship status, the argument is that if greater deference is given to a fundamental rights 
discourse in the case law as an approach generally adopted by the CJEU, then this gap may 
be narrowed. In Pisciotti, an Italian in Germany was sought by the United States for 
extradition,48 and ‘a non-discrimination analysis is ultimately displaced by a free movement 
analysis’ with even less engagement with Article 18 TFEU than in Petruhhin.49 The CJEU 
confirmed that extraditing the claimant to the USA would amount to a restriction on his free 
movement, but that alternatively, he could be surrendered to Italy which would be less of an 
interference. Pisciotti confirmed that the CJEU now considered that obstacles to free 
movement brought situations within the scope of the Treaty and formed the basis of conferral 
of protection. In terms of a temporal correlation with the migration crisis, there may be an 
underlying trend in the CJEU of pulling back from an entirely fundamental rights-based 
approach.50 
 
The CJEU failing to embrace a fundamental rights discourse continues in cases on the 
Framework Directive on the European Arrest Warrant (FDEAW), many of which also involve 
non-EU citizens.51 They have seen the CJEU being less flexible when considering if 
exceptions to executing arrest warrants can be allowed. Member State are able to refuse to 
                                               
45 C-182/15 Petruhhin EU:C:2016:630. 
46 Niamh Nic Shuibhne, ‘The ‘Territory of the Union’ in EU Citizenship Law: Charting a Route from Parallel to 
Integrated Narratives’ (2019) 38 YEL 267, 295. 
47 Miguel João Costa, ‘The emerging EU extradition law: Petruhhin and beyond’ (2017) 8 New Journal of European 
Criminal Law 192, 214. 
48 C-191/16 Pisciotti EU:C:2018:222. 
49 Stephen Coutts, ‘From Union citizens to national subjects: Pisciotti’ (2019) 56 CML Rev 521, 528. 
50 Conversely, see C‑247/17 Raugevicius EU:C:2018:898, where an EU citizen’s long term resident status in the 
host Member State, Finland, was a consideration in the CJEU’s determination that he should not be extradited. 
51 See C-396/11 Radu EU:C:2013:39; C-394/12 Abdullahi EU:C:2013:813; C-404/15 Aranyosi EU:C:2016:198. For 
further, see Ermioni Xanthopoulou, Fundamental Rights and Mutual Trust in the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice: A Role for Proportionality? (Bloomsbury Publishing 2020). 
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execute an arrest warrant issued by another Member State in order to protect the fundamental 
rights of the individual in question – namely, promoting a rights-based individual assessments. 
However, recently, instead of putting the individual at the centre of the consideration – whether 
EU citizens or not – precedent shows that necessary derogations from the principle of mutual 
trust, a principle which assumes that Member States trust each other’s criminal processes, 
are now being ‘firmly tamed and controlled.’52  
 
These case law trends demonstrate a hesitance in the CJEU towards fully embracing a rights-
based citizen-centric discourse in the Union in the AFSJ. In this context, Nic Shuibhne rightly 
argues that the EU has become less citizen-centric and more territory focused.53 By keeping 
EU citizens within the EU territory, the AFSJ’s borders are protected. As the above cases 
show, this places much emphasis on free movement and residence rights under Article 21 
TFEU.54 If EU citizenship status is meant to be rights-driven as an independent legal basis for 
conferral of rights-based protection, then the approach Nic Shuibhne describes moves further 
away from a future for EU citizenship that wholly embraces a fundamental rights discourse, 
and instead reinforces the borders of Fortress Europe. This approach translated into migration 
cases that involve non-EU citizens is the concern that this paper identifies. 
 
C. RULE OF LAW CRISIS 
 
Overlapping temporally with both the Eurozone and migration crises is the third crisis identified 
in this paper concerning the rule of law.55 This crisis has seen EU values protected under 
Article 2 TEU systematically being breached by certain Member States,56 and there has been 
little success in trying to deter these Member States (at times, more forcefully) from continuing 
to do so.57 A triangular relationship is said to exist between the rule of law, democracy and 
fundamental rights, meaning that they are ‘inherently and indivisibly interconnected, and 
interdependent on each of the others, and they cannot be separated without inflicting profound 
                                               
52 Ermioni Xanthopoulou, ‘Mutual Trust and Rights in EU Criminal and Asylum Law: Three Phases of Evolution and 
the Uncharted Territory Beyond Blind Trust’ (2018) 55 CML Rev 495. 
53 Nic Shuibhne, ‘The ‘Territory of the Union’ in EU Citizenship Law: Charting a Route from Parallel to Integrated 
Narratives’ (n46) 281. 
54 For a lengthy debate on the merits and demerits of basing EU citizenship rights on free movement, see 
contributions by Floris de Witte et al in Rainer Baubock (ed), Debating European Citizenship (Springer 2019). 
55 Viviane Reding, ‘The EU and the Rule of Law – What next’ (EU Commission, 4 September 2013)  
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_13_677> accessed 20 February 2020.  
56 The values include ‘respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for 
human rights.’ The Member States concerned are mostly Central and Eastern European states, particularly 
Hungary and Poland. See Dimitry Kochenov and Petra Bárd, ‘Rule of Law Crisis in the New Member States of the 
EU: The Pitfalls of Overemphasising Enforcement’ [2018] RECONNECT Working Paper No 1—July 2018. 
57 Leonard Besselink, ‘The Bite, the Bark, and the Howl: Article 7 TEU and the Rule of Law Initiatives’ in Dimitry 
Kochenov and András Jakab (eds), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values (Oxford University Press 2017). 
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damage to the whole and changing its essential shape and configuration.’58 This is important, 
for it shows how attacks on the rule of law could affect fundamental rights protection and vice 
versa – how protection of the rule of law could bolster rights. As such, the analysis is more 
future-focused, advocating for a refocus on values like fundamental rights – as part of 
citizenship – to encourage an overall shift in the judicial approach as the CJEU navigates this 
crisis. 
 
Sarmiento and Sharpston linked the triangular relationship most succinctly to EU citizenship 
status arguing that Article 2 TEU values ‘also entitles the citizen to require the necessary 
safeguards from the Union’s institutions against arbitrary action that breaches basic 
constitutional principles.’59 Taken to its logical conclusions, the status of EU citizenship and its 
associated rights bear consideration in light of the rule of law and the recent crises of the rule 
of law unfolding in various Member States. The situation has deteriorated since 2015 mainly 
in Hungary and Poland because of the rise of the far right in their respective governments.60 
As Pech and Scheppele put it, ‘[t]he ‘values crisis’ may not seem as urgent as the other crises 
on European plates, but it has the most far-reaching implications for the European 
project…[because] there are fewer reasons for the EU to exist’.61 Therefore, given the urgency 
and importance of correctly handling this crisis, the approach taken by the CJEU in dealing 
with cases related to the rule of law is of interest for there have been some positive 
developments of late. 
 
In Commission v Poland, an attempt was made by Polish authorities to lower judges’ 
retirement ages in the Supreme Court. It was held that this infringed the principle of judges’ 
irremovability and independence of the judiciary.62 The CJEU decided that Poland had 
infringed its obligations under Article 19(1) TEU on providing national ‘remedies sufficient to 
ensure effective legal protection’ with this new law on judges’ retirement ages. This is an 
important decision in light of the fundamental rights discourse in citizenship because ‘the Court 
seems to render Article 2 TEU judicially applicable’ through Article 19(1) TEU in what is 
described as a ‘combined approach’.63 This is similar to what this paper suggests when 
                                               
58 Sergio Carrera, Elspeth Guild and Nicholas Hernanz, The triangular relationship between fundamental rights, 
democracy and the rule of law in the EU: towards an EU Copenhagen mechanism (Centre for European Policy 
Studies, 2013). 
59 Daniel Sarmiento and Eleanor Sharpston, ‘European Citizenship and Its New Union: Time to Move On?’ in 
Dimitry Kochenov (ed), EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights (Cambridge University Press 2017) 
238. 
60 Melanie Smith, ‘Staring into the Abyss: A Crisis of the Rule of Law in the EU’ [2019] ELR 568. 
61 Laurent Pech and Kim Lane Scheppele, ‘Illiberalism within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the EU’ (2017) 19 CYELS 
3, 5. 
62 C-179/19 Commission v Poland EU:C:2019:531. 
63 Luke Dimitrios Spieker, ‘Commission v. Poland – A Stepping Stone Towards a Strong “Union of Values”?’ 
(Verfassungsblog, 30 May 2019)  <https://verfassungsblog.de/commission-v-poland-a-stepping-stone-towards-a-
strong-union-of-values/> accessed 10 June 2020. 
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arguing that the legal gateway for fundamental rights protection is EU citizenship status. 
Spieker notes that this case builds on the decision in Associação Sindical dos Juízes 
Portugueses, where the CJEU laid the groundwork for its “combined approach” giving 
‘concrete expression to the value of the rule of law stated in Article 2 TEU’ through Article 19 
TEU as well.64 He suggests that seeking to protect the EU’s common values in this way could 
remedy further assaults on the rule of law in the EU.65 Importantly, this approach can be 
positively translated to fundamental rights protection, in that EU citizenship status is the 
equivalent of Article 19 TEU, a status that can give concrete expression to Article 2 TEU – 
specifically respect for human rights. 
 
There is a valid connection between the rule of law and individual rights given that these are 
what are at stake when seeking to protect the EU community of citizens.66 Given this, it would 
be possible to expand the CJEU’s framing of the expression of Treaty values to fundamental 
right through EU citizenship status to achieve the objective of protecting values under Article 
2 TEU, human rights. The relationship supported throughout this paper of EU citizenship as 
the legal gateway for fundamental rights seems more feasible, remaining within the limits of 
the Treaties and strengthening the Union’s overall resolve to stand by and protect the values 
that it is premised on. However, whilst a connection between fundamental rights and the rule 
of law (and democracy) has some clear benefits in the context of EU citizenship, proceeding 
with caution is recommended going forward, due to the fact that the rule of law crisis is not 
abating.67 There is still a risk of triggering further distrust and rogue behaviour in Member 
States and worsening the rule of law crises because the above approach could raise questions 
of competence.68 The fact that there is collateral damage to citizens’ rights if rule of 
law backsliding continues makes it all the more important to champion an integrated 
fundamental rights discourse in EU citizenship. The cases here show that this is entirely 
possible. 
 
D. BREXIT 
 
The UK’s withdrawal from the EU has been of increasing interest since mid-2016, when the 
                                               
64 C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses EU:C:2018:117. 
65 Luke Dimitrios Spieker, ‘Breathing Life into the Union’s Common Values: On the Judicial Application of Article 2 
TEU in the EU Value Crisis’ (2019) 20 German Law Journal 1182, 1207. 
66 Sandra Mantu, ‘EU citizenship and the rule of law in times of Brexit: generosity by reciprocity’ (EU Global 
Leadership in the Rule of Law Conference, Zagreb, February 2019). 
67 Ottavio Marzocchi, The Impact of Covid-19 Measures on Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights 
in the EU (European Parliament, Briefing requested by the LIBE committee Monitoring Group on Democracy, Rule 
of Law, Fundamental Rights, 2020). 
68 Armin von Bogdandy and Luke Dimitrios Spieker, ‘Countering the Judicial Silencing of Critics: Article 2 TEU 
Values, Reverse Solange, and the Responsibilities of National Judges’ (2019) 15 European Constitutional Law 
Review 391, 419. 
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UK voted in favour of leaving the EU. One of the main negotiating priorities of the EU was 
citizens’ rights.69 A renewed understanding of the importance of EU citizenship status can be 
argued to have arisen in light of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. Given that the transition 
period for withdrawal has not yet ended at the time of writing, the exact shape of the UK’s 
relationship with the EU has yet to be determined. As such, cases here do not directly address 
consequences of the UK’s withdrawal specifically, but their judicial rationale can be 
transposed to potential Brexit scenarios.70 The general sense is that there is a higher level of 
protection under EU law as to protection of citizens’ rights than in national law, especially that 
of the UK.71 Therefore, most citizenship cases of relevance concern reliance upon EU 
citizenship through Member State nationality and assessing the proportionality of the status 
no longer being available as a legal basis for rights. 
   
In 2017, Lounes saw a Spanish national naturalised as British after moving to the UK marry 
an Algerian, who then applied for residency as the non-EU spouse of an EU citizen. He was 
denied on the basis that his wife had naturalised after exercising her Treaty rights and could 
no longer rely on Directive 2004/38, but only on national law now as a British citizen. The 
CJEU confirmed that Directive 2004/38 did not form a legal basis for derived residency rights 
for non-EU spouses, proving how limited its scope for rights had become.72 Instead, though, 
the claimant could rely on Article 21(1) TFEU for the same rights, demonstrating that better 
protection existed under the Treaties for EU citizenship.73 It highlights that losing EU 
citizenship status would clearly put individuals in a less desirable position as to their rights 
protection,74 which here would have seen rights to family reunification – a fundamental right 
under the right to private and family life – interfered with.75 Seen from a fundamental rights 
perspective, this becomes a more urgent question. If it is accepted that the fundamental status 
of EU citizenship also gives rise to fundamental rights protection, then this will be lost when 
                                               
69 Negotiations culminated in Council (EU) 2019/C 384, Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community (12 
November 2019), Part Two Citizens’ Rights. 
70 The only potential case specifically on Brexit and citizens’ rights ultimately did not reach the CJEU, see Ronan  
McCrea, ‘Brexit EU Citizenship Rights of UK Nationals and the Court of Justice’ (UK Constitutional Law Association 
Blog, 8 February 2018)  <https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2018/02/08/ronan-mccrea-brexit-eu-citizenship-rights-of-
uk-nationals-and-the-court-of-justice> accessed 6 March 2020. 
71 Eleanor Spaventa, ‘Mice or Horses? British Citizens in the EU 27 after Brexit as “Former EU Citizens’ (2019) 5 
ELR 589; Eleanor Spaventa, ‘The rights of citizens under the Withdrawal Agreement: a critical analysis’ (2020) 45 
ELR 193. The new regime for EU citizens in the UK post-Brexit, the EU Settlement Scheme, also presents 
administrative challenges, see Joe Tomlinson, Quick and Uneasy Justice: an Administrative Justice Analysis of the 
EU Settlement Scheme (Public Law Project, 2019). 
72 C-165/16 Lounes EU:C:2017:862, para 44. 
73 Jo Shaw, ‘EU citizenship: still a fundamental status?’ in Rainer Baubock (ed), Debating European Citizenship 
(Springer 2019) 4. 
74 See also, Lisa O’Carroll, ‘Northern Ireland-born British and Irish win EU citizenship rights’ The Guardian (14 May 
2020) <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/may/14/northern-ireland-born-british-and-irish-win-eu-
citizenship-rights> accessed 11 June 2020. Emma de Souza won the right of non-EU spouses of Northern Irish 
nationals (whether British or Irish) to apply for settled status under the EU Settlement Scheme. 
75 Article 7 Charter, Article 8 ECHR. 
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EU citizens lose the right to rely on these rights after Brexit. 
 
More recently in Tjebbes, the CJEU saw several Dutch nationals automatically lose Dutch 
nationality after being outside the Netherlands for 10 consecutive years or more as per Dutch 
law. The area of nationality law is accepted to be outside the competence of the EU,76 so the 
CJEU brought the matter within its competences by arguing that loss of nationality can affect 
EU citizenship status, a precedent it had set in past case law.77 It then stated that EU law does 
not preclude Member States from having a such a law to satisfy genuine link requirements for 
conferring nationality, but it is necessary for the conditions to have due consideration to 
proportionality if loss of nationality would affect rights under EU citizenship status.78 When 
undertaking this proportionality assessment, the consequences of losing EU citizenship 
‘cannot be hypothetical or merely a possibility.’79 This case has potentially wide-reaching 
implications due to the comparable situation of Brexit, where loss of EU citizenship status is 
certainly not hypothetical nor merely a possibility after the transition period ends. 
 
Tjebbes seems to recognise that as in Lounes, losing EU citizenship status and the rights 
therein is not a desirable position to be in. It cleverly tries to strike a balance between Member 
State and EU interests,80 but more importantly it sets a strong precedent to require a thorough 
proportionality assessment in light of tangible effects on the claimant upon loss of their EU 
citizenship rights, not unlike its predecessor Rottmann.81 It is here where the fundamental 
rights discourse is all the more relevant, for if a serious infringement of one’s fundamental 
rights is considered a disproportionate reason to remove one’s claim to this right through EU 
citizenship status, then it bolsters the status’ substance and worth, truly proving its 
fundamental nature. The stronger the claim to fundamental rights through EU citizenship, the 
greater the chances that losing EU citizenship status would be declared disproportionate. 
Therefore, the value of Lounes and Tjebbes in the context of EU citizenship’s future in a post-
Brexit Britain is to show that having EU citizenship can put individuals in a better position 
particularly as to protection of their right to private and family life.82 
 
 
 
                                               
76 C-369/90 Micheletti EU:C:1992:295. 
77 C-221/17 Tjebbes EU:C:2019:189, para 32; Rottmann (n13). 
78 Tjebbes (n77) para 40. 
79 Ibid para 44.  
80 Hanneke van Eijken, ‘Tjebbes in Wonderland: On European Citizenship, Nationality and Fundamental Rights’ 
(2019) 15 European Constitutional Law Review 714. 
81 Rottmann (n13). 
82 Adrienne Yong, ‘Human rights protection as justice in post-Brexit Britain: a case study of deportation’ in Tawhida 
Ahmed and Elaine Fahey (eds), On Brexit: Law, Justices and Injustices (Edward Elgar 2019). 
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IV. A FUTURE FOR EU CITIZENSHIP AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS? 
 
The aim of the analysis of the above four crises was to highlight how fundamental rights 
through citizenship should, and later, could play a role in order to assess whether there is a 
future for EU citizenship and fundamental rights. In some cases, fundamental rights did not 
play enough of a role, such as in the context of the Eurozone and migration crisis. However, 
in the rule of law crisis and Brexit, the benefits of this relationship can be argued to have 
become more evident. Perhaps there was more reason initially to be pessimistic about the 
future of EU citizenship and fundamental rights early on because of the political disquiet in the 
Eurozone and migration crises. The general sense of dissatisfaction with the EU was 
particularly prominent then, as perception of the effects on citizens’ quality of life and personal 
situations loomed large for many after the crises first began.83 
 
However, as the EU progressed slowly out of its Eurozone and migration crises and serious 
assaults on EU values in Article 2 TEU started to increase, perhaps it can be argued that there 
was more of a political need for the EU to reassert its values and enforcement to combat this. 
Indeed, the case law briefly outlined above in the context of the rule of law and Brexit 
demonstrate this. The rule of law case law proves that an EU based on its values – like respect 
for human rights – is possible, and not just normatively. In this way, the EU can also avoid 
instigating further tensions which may arise from applying sanctions for breach of the rule of 
law under Article 7 TEU, referred to as the ‘nuclear option’ by the then Commission President, 
José Manuel Barroso.84 The citizenship case law applicable to Brexit demonstrates that it is 
indeed a valuable to hold, and more importantly, retain EU citizenship.85 Therefore, the 
argument is that reasserting respect for human rights should be done through the legal 
gateway of EU citizenship status. In this way, there can be a future for EU citizenship status 
and fundamental rights. 
 
This optimistic view of EU citizenship status’ future can be taken if looking to cases which 
mainly focus on rights under Article 20-21 TFEU, rather than Directive 2004/38 in more recent 
years. Indeed, criticism of EU citizenship as seen in the context of the migration crisis 
concerning its exclusionary and conditional nature is all the more prominent in light of what 
the CJEU confirm about Directive 2004/38, namely that it strictly follows the conditions under 
Article 7(1)(b) of having sufficient resources and comprehensive health insurance in order to 
                                               
83 Eurobarometer 76.1 Crisis (n31). 
84 Commission, State of the Union 2012 Address (Speech/12/596, 12 September 2012). 
85 Especially as the Withdrawal Agreement retains mostly the conditions and provisions under Directive 2004/38, 
see Stijn Smismans, Ring-fencing Citizens’ Rights in the Brexit Negotiations: Legal Framework and Political 
Dynamics (DCU Brexit Institute-Working Paper 1-2019, 2019). 
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fall within the scope of the Directive, and the fact that a purely internal situation will not trigger 
its application either.86 For Directive 2004/38’s provisions to apply, it thus requires a triggering 
of the Treaty through exercising free movement rights, which, noted earlier, discriminates 
between those who can actually avail themselves of this right and those who cannot. It is thus 
positive that several more recent cases on family reunification have seen outcomes that have 
the effect of protecting non-EU family members’ rights – a familiar fundamental right in the 
context of EU citizenship. 
 
In Coman, an American married to a Romanian sought residency in Romania, rejected on the 
basis that Romania did not recognise same-sex marriages. The CJEU confirmed that Directive 
2004/38 could not confer a derived right of residency autonomously to non-EU citizens, but it 
also did not allow Member States to deny derived residency solely based on the non-
recognition of same-sex marriages.87 In RH, a Moroccan married to a Spanish national was 
refused residency because his Spanish wife had not shown she had sufficient resources to 
fall within Directive 2004/38.88 The CJEU makes pains to emphasises that as a whole, ‘EU law 
does not, in principle, apply to an application for family reunification of a third-country 
national’89 but Article 20 TFEU might apply instead as long as there was evidence of a 
deprivation of genuine enjoyment forcing the EU citizen to leave the territory of the EU if their 
family did not successfully derive rights. Lounes, mentioned earlier, can also be considered 
under the umbrella of cases which rely on the Treaty rather than the Directive to confer rights 
on non-EU family members. These cases are, in general, positive for refocusing the narrative 
in the CJEU on EU citizenship status rather than the internal market. However, what is not so 
obvious from just analysing the outcomes is that the CJEU is returning to the notion that these 
derived rights are justified because there would otherwise be an obstacle to free movement, 
not fundamental rights. 
 
In all three cases above, family reunification rights were evidently the main substance of the 
rights that the non-EU spouses sought. However, a thorough assessment of the right to private 
and family life is entirely missing from each judgment. Not unlike the extradition cases 
considered under the migration crisis, weight is being placed on having exercised free 
movement rights rather than simply on the status of being an EU citizen. There is a discord 
with this and the interpretation that Article 20 TFEU is the gateway for recourse to a wider 
scope of rights. Having outlined the trajectory and merits of a fundamental rights discourse as 
                                               
86 McCarthy (n35) para 43. 
87 C-673/16 Coman and Others EU:C:2018:385. 
88 C-836/18 RH EU:C:2020:119. 
89 Ibid para 33. 
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part of the scope ratione materiae of EU citizenship, going back to free movement obstacles 
suggests a re-emergence of market-based citizenship.90 All three cases could have been 
decided instead on the basis of fundamental rights protection as part of being an EU citizen. 
Even worse in Lounes, reference to Article 20 TFEU itself is absent and only Article 21 TFEU 
is mentioned. Therefore, what these cases show is that there may be a future for EU 
citizenship, but that it might not be based on fundamental rights protection. The crises analysis 
outlined why this is not desirable. 
 
Whilst it is difficult to conceive of EU citizenship status in any other form than being cleaved 
to Member State nationality because of the very nature of the EU as a supranational entity,91 
this is not the same for EU citizenship as market citizenship. This paper has supported the 
argument that there must be more emphasis on a connection through the fundamental status 
of EU citizenship to fundamental rights protection. This would allow the status to fit within the 
rigid framework within which EU law – in particular, EU citizenship status – finds itself limited 
by. The CJEU has transcended these boundaries by supporting the normative discourses on 
rights protection and interpreting EU citizenship status as being one that seeks to protect 
fundamental rights as an inherent part of its scope ratione materiae. 
 
However, Thym argued that indicators of disquiet amongst the EU community and greater 
Euroscepticism go as far back as the rejection of the Draft Constitutional Treaty in the early 
2000s. As such, he believed it was almost inevitable that ‘any fortification of citizens’ rights 
beyond the single market remains linked to broader constitutional trends’.92 This claim can be 
linked to the crises’ potential negative effects on the scope of fundamental rights and EU 
citizenship. Indeed recently, more explanation is demanded for choices being made before 
the CJEU, but ironically, the more explanations are given, the greater the risk is of raising 
future conflict and disagreements.93 After all, the outcomes were favourable for the non-EU 
spouses in the cases above, so the question remains: what exactly is the value of emphasising 
fundamental rights is if the outcome can be reached in other ways? 
 
The answer to this is that it appears by focusing on free movement that the CJEU is behaving 
as if it is trying to determine if a citizen is “deserving” of protection through an examination of 
whether the individual demonstrates a sufficient level of solidarity and integration with the host 
                                               
90 Niamh Nic Shuibhne, ‘The Resilience of EU Market Citizenship’ (2010) 47 CML Rev 1597. 
91 Though there are some who argue for its autonomy from nationality, see Oliver Garner, ‘The existential crisis of 
citizenship of the European Union: the argument for an autonomous status’ (2018) 20 CYELS 116.  
92 Daniel Thym, ‘The Failure of Union Citizenship Beyond the Single Market’ in Rainer Baubock (ed), Debating 
European Citizenship (Springer 2019) 106. 
93 Nic Shuibhne, ‘The ‘Territory of the Union’ in EU Citizenship Law: Charting a Route from Parallel to Integrated 
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State.94 This would also somewhat suggest that the EU condones Member States putting 
different values on different individuals, again harking back to the days of contributory 
reciprocal nature of free movement rights of economically active citizens.95 The primary reason 
for firmly being in favour of protecting citizenship as a status protecting fundamental rights is 
because citizens and their rights have always been tangential to the internal market.96 In these 
situations, the individual and their rights suffered as collateral damage of the operation of 
policies that were established to resolve such crises, as noted in the rule of law context in 
terms of the triangular relationship of EU values. Each crisis’ effects are lasting and bleed into 
other areas where new crises emerge in a constantly shifting political order. Therefore, the 
individual needs to be protected and kept at the heart of the considerations. This can be done 
if EU citizenship status is the legal gateway to fundamental rights protection. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has addressed the question of whether there is a future for EU citizenship status 
and fundamental rights in light of four crises befalling the EU since the Lisbon Treaty – the 
Eurozone, migration & rule of law crises and the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. Setting out the 
original trajectory of EU citizenship status, it was argued that the status had gained 
prominence and substance because of the fundamental rights discourse that it became the 
legal gateway for. As such, a mutually reinforcing relationship is offered as the appropriate 
avenue going forward for the future of EU citizenship status, for the case law has shown that 
there is room for fundamental rights to play more of a central role. This paper demonstrated 
how and why this is possible, and argued that it should be the future of EU citizenship status. 
Whilst perhaps previously it may have seemed as though there was a different trajectory for 
EU citizenship in light of the difficulties of the Eurozone and migration crises, as the EU faced 
its rule of law crises and Brexit, there is some indication perhaps of a renewed sense of 
solidarity of values. These values, which accord with fundamental rights protection, can and 
should be protected through the gateway of EU citizenship status. It is this, it has been argued, 
which should be their future in the EU. 
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